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would cause Council decision­making to slip back 
into the pattern of impasse and delay that had been 
decisively broken in the mid 1980s. This was one of 
the constant background issues in the debate about 
enlargement. Still greater use of majority voting was 
certainly part of the answer, especially in the revised 
co­decision procedure discussed above. But as von 
Donat’s note had suggested, other alterations in be­
haviour also needed to be explored. This was to have 
been the main business of the Treaty of Nice, but 
when this proved inadequate it became something 
that would have to await first the abortive European 
constitution and then the Lisbon Treaty of 2008.
Piers Ludlow
8.3. From love affair to 
stand-off: relations 
with the European 
Parliament
The relationship between the European Commis­
sion and the European Parliament evolved substan­
tially during the years under review. At first this 
change was largely positive: Jacques Delors would 
enjoy a generally good relationship with Strasbourg 
and would be given substantial credit by Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs) for transform­
ing the European Community (EC) system for the 
better. It was Delors seemingly who had been most 
important in delivering the first substantial increase 
in the Parliament’s powers since 1979; it was Delors 
furthermore who brought to a mutually satisfac tory 
end the lengthy struggle between the Parliament 
and the Council/Commission over the setting of 
Community budgets. More broadly, Delors and 
his Commissions were given credit for delivering 
both ‘more Europe’ — in the form of enhanced in­
tegration — and more attention to Europe, both of 
which were regarded as welcome developments by 
most MEPs. But this highly positive relationship 
began to sour as the 1990s advanced, with Parlia­
ment–Commission relations becoming that much 
more antagonistic. And the rise of mutual suspicion 
would culminate in the biggest single crisis in Stras­
bourg–Brussels relations to date, namely the row 
that would precipitate the collective resignation of 
the Santer Commission in 1999.
It had all started so well. Jacques Delors was not 
the first Commission President to promise MEPs 
that he would take Parliament more seriously than 
ever before; François­Xavier Ortoli, Roy Jenkins 
and Gaston Thorn had all made similar pledges (1). 
Nor was he unique in having been a member of 
(1) See Bussière et al., The European Commission 1973-86, p. 231.
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the  Strasbourg institution; Thorn too had been an 
MEP, albeit prior to the start of direct elections. But 
where Delors was able to score substantially in com­
parison with his direct predecessors was in his per­
ceived success at delivering the political outcomes 
that the majority of MEPs yearned for. It was polit­
ical results rather than atmospherics that were the 
basis of the warm rapport that developed between 
the Delors Commissions and European parliamen­
tarians.
The first important step in this direction was the 
Single European Act, and more specifically the in­
troduction of the cooperation procedure, an insti­
tutional change that at last gave the Parliament a 
greater degree of influence over the Community’s 
legislative process. It was true of course that neither 
MEPs nor the Commission were wholly satisfied 
with what had been agreed. The Parliament would 
go on pressing for substantial increases in its power 
throughout the period from 1986 to 2000. But the 
cooperation procedure was an important start (1).
It was a step, furthermore, that needed to be fol­
lowed up with practical alterations in the Com­
mission’s behaviour towards the Parliament. In 
early 1986 P eter Sutherland, as the Commissioner 
responsible for Relations with the European Par­
liament, presented an important discussion docu­
ment to his Commission colleagues, designed to 
form the basis for ‘a broad strategic debate on its 
relations with Parliament’, and advancing a num­
ber of tangible suggestions for change  (2). Central 
to this document was the assumption of a broad al­
liance of interest between Strasbourg and Brussels: 
‘The Commission should adopt a clear strategic ap­
proach, based on the mutual interest of the two in­
stitutions in improving relations. The Commission 
(1) See also Chapter 15 ‘Environmental policy’.
(2) HAEU, DORIE 734, ‘Preliminary discussion paper on relations with the 
European Parliament’, 26 February 1986. This would in due course become 
SEC(86) 417, 20 March 1986, ‘Relations with the European Parliament — 
Communication from Mr Sutherland, in agreement with the President and 
Mr Ripa di Meana’.
has much to gain in terms of political support, from 
good and stable relations with Parliament. Parlia­
ment, for its part, can improve its image and effect­
iveness by good relations with the Commission’ (3). 
But in order for both bodies to derive maximum 
advantage from their cooperation this needed to 
be made much more efficient and systematic. This 
would involve not only greater interinstitution­
al dialogue and cooperation, but also a change in 
the Commission’s culture leading to a situation in 
which ‘awareness of the Parliamentary dimension 
is at all times a major strand in the Commission’s 
thinking’  (4). Sutherland’s ideas were discussed by 
the Commission in both March and April 1986, 
aired before the parliamentarians themselves in 
October and then complemented with a further 
internal Commission review conducted in Novem­
ber (5). The latter placed particular emphasis on the 
need for both ‘legislative planning’ and ‘prior con­
sultation’ between Commissioners and Commis­
sion officials on the one hand, and representatives 
of the main parliamen tary groups on the other (6). 
The former would help lead to the emergence of the 
so­called Neunreither Group (later known as In­
terinstitutional Coordin ation Group), a monthly 
meeting of Parliament, Council and Commission 
officials designed to better coordinate the legislative 
timetables of the three institutions (7). And the lat­
ter would contribute to an important behavioural 
change within the Commission, with most direct­
orates­general and Commissioners devoting in­
creased attention to informal consultation and the 
(3) HAEC, SG(86) D/1509, 11 February 1986, ‘Note for the attention of Mr 
O’Toole on the draft communication to the Commission on relations with 
the European Parliament’.
(4) Ibid.
(5) For the Commission discussions, see HAEC, COM(86), Minutes No 820, 
meeting of 25  March 1986; COM(86), Minutes No  822, meeting of 
9 April 1986. For the parliamentary presentation, see HAEC, IP(86) 474, 
press  release ‘Intervention of Commissioner Peter Sutherland on relations 
between the European Parliament and the Commission (summary)’, 
8  October 1986.
(6) HAEU, DORIE 734, SEC(86) 1928, 14 November 1986, ‘Relations with 
the European Parliament within the framework of the cooperation proced­
ure provided for by the Single Act — Communication from Mr Sutherland 
in agreement with the President and Mr Ripa di Meana’.
(7) Stacey, J., Integrating Europe — Informal politics and institutional change, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 90­91. See also interview with 
Una O’Dwyer, 16 February 2018.
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cultivation of good relations with members of the 
parliamentary committees most relevant to their 
activities. (1) 
The second breakthrough was the transformation of 
the budgetary procedure (2). For most of the  per iod 
between 1979 and the agreement of the Delors  I 
package in 1988, the annual setting of the Commu­
nity’s budget had become the occasion for a power 
struggle between the Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission, resulting in delays, arguments 
and resentment. In particular, the Parliament dis­
liked its inability to control the vast amount spent 
on the common agricultural policy, which counted 
as obligatory expenditure and was hence not subject 
(1) Testimony of Anne Serizier. The trend would of course become even more 
pronounced once the co­decision procedure was introduced.
(2) See Chapter 9 ‘The budgetary revolution: from near bankruptcy to 
 stability’.
to parliamentary control — and the constant rise of 
which squeezed the non­obligatory spending over 
which the Parliament did have some say. Runaway 
bills for the common agricultural policy hence dir­
ectly eroded the Parliament’s financial control. The 
Parliament had much to gain from the Delors I pack­
age, even if the move to multiannual financial per­
spectives did mean that the leverage it gained over 
the Council through its role in the annual budget 
process would be somewhat restricted. It also appre­
ciated the way in which the Commission worked 
hard to involve Strasbourg in the discussion of the 
budgetary advance. The Parliament had bitterly re­
sented the way in which it had been presented with 
a fait accompli by the European Council decisions 
at Fontainebleau, and was hence relieved to be much 
more directly involved with the next budget ary set­
tlement. The interinstitutional agreement signed as 
part of the Delors I package underlined its status as 
an equal member of the Community’s three­headed 
Meeting between Peter Sutherland (left), Commissioner responsible for Relations with the European Parliament, and Pierre Pflimlin (right), 
President of the European Parliament, in Strasbourg, on 13 January 1986.
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budgetary authority. And MEPs too were pleased 
with a cessation of the annual battle over the EC’s 
finances, especially as it permitted more construct­
ive interinstitutional cooperation. Once more 
therefore, Delors, as the principal architect of the 
settlement, received a great deal of credit in the eyes 
of most parliamentarians.
At a more general level, early relations between the 
Delors Commissions and the Parliament were  aided 
by the extraordinary advances of the integration 
period during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Most 
MEPs, after all, were ardent partisans of further and 
faster European integration; they were hence almost 
bound to regard with favour a Commission that 
seemed able to deliver so much. Delors’s interac­
tion with Parliament thus benefited from that same 
virtuous spiral of success that characterised the 
Commission President’s relations with his own staff 
and with most members of the European Coun­
cil (1). But rapid progress could also raise unrealis­
tic expect ations among MEPs and encourage them 
to press impatiently for additional powers without 
waiting for an intergovernmental conference and a 
new round of treaty change.
This was certainly what the Commission believed 
was happening by early 1990, as the new Parliament 
elected the previous year proved particularly hard 
to work with. In January the Commission held an 
urgent internal discussion of the deterioration in 
Parliament–Commission links, basing themselves 
upon a somewhat gloomy analysis of the relation­
ship between Strasbourg and Brussels drawn up 
by Martin Bangemann  (2). Underpinning Bange­
mann’s analysis was a fear that the Community’s 
efforts to meet its self­imposed 1992 deadline might 
be compromised if interinstitutional relations were 
allowed to fester. As Delors put it to his colleagues 
when introducing the debate: ‘The main issue, then, 
(1) See the profile of Jacques Delors.
(2) HAEC, SEC(90)  175/2, 26  January 1990, ‘Relations with the European 
Parliament — Communication from Mr Bangemann’.
is whether it is appropriate for the Commission to 
change the interinstitutional set­up straight away, or 
if it should hold on to all its prerogatives at the risk 
of being censured by the Parliament’ (3). In the de­
bate that followed, some Commissioners — Chris­
tiane Scrivener and Sir Leon Brittan in particular — 
were hesitant about making any concessions to the 
Parliament, and others doubted whether there was 
 really any likelihood of the Parliament censuring 
the Commission, but there was general support for 
the series of small gestures designed to smooth rela­
tions with MEPs suggested by Bangemann. Delors 
himself undertook to explore the issue with the Par­
liament the following month (4). The outcome was 
a code of conduct agreed by the two institutions in 
April 1990 (5). In this document the Commission 
promised to remind the Council not to come to a 
political agreement before the Parliament had ex­
pressed its views, to keep the Parliament abreast of 
discussions in the Council and to make certain that 
the Parliament was consulted again in cases where 
the proposed legislation had been substantially 
alter ed in the course of Council debates. The Com­
mission would also seek the views of the Parliament 
as well as the Council about the appropriate legal 
base chosen for draft legislation. In return MEPs 
promised to make interinstitutional cooperation as 
effective as possible, and in particular to prioritise 
the smooth passage of laws needed for the comple­
tion of the single market by the end of 1992. These 
gestures appeared sufficient to restore cooperative 
relations in the short term.
A rather more serious wave of parliamentary unease 
became apparent once the ceaseless forward move­
ment of the late 1980s began to falter from about 
1992 onwards. Like Delors himself, Strasbourg 
was not greatly enamoured with the Maastricht 
Treaty as a whole, since the important advances 
(3) HAEC, COM(90), Minutes No 997, second part, meeting of 31 January 
1990, p. 17. 
(4) HAEC, COM(90), Minutes No 997, second part, meeting of 31 January 
1990.
(5) Bulletin of the European Communities, No 4, 1990, pp. 80­81.
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The fight against fraud
One of the most noticeable features of the 
Commission’s activities during the 1986-2000 period 
was the stepping up of the fight against fraud. 1987 
thus saw the Commission’s decision to establish its 
first dedicated internal unit devoted to detecting and 
responding to cases in which European Community 
funds and programmes had been misused, whereas 
the period would end with the creation in 1999 of a 
stronger and more powerful anti-fraud body. Such 
forward movement, while significant, would not 
however prove sufficient to satisfy fully external 
concern about the issue, whether expressed through 
the media or by the European Parliament. The 
perceived inadequacies of Commission efforts to 
address fraud would thus lie at the heart of the fall of 
the Santer Commission in 1999.
By the mid 1980s pressure was mounting on the 
European Commission to increase its efforts to combat 
fraud involving the Community budget. In part this 
reflected the rapidly increasing size of the budget and 
hence, in theory at least, the amount of money ‘at risk’. 
Important too may have been the pressure on the 
Community budget, meaning that any money wasted 
was ever more sensitive (1). But it also constituted a 
response to growing pressure from the European 
Parliament in particular. In 1986 the Budgetary 
Control Committee of the Parliament had held a public 
hearing on the subject; late that same year its chair 
had written to Commissioner Henning Christophersen 
with a questionnaire about Commission efforts to 
combat fraud; and in April 1987 a Parliamentary 
resolution (2) invited the Commission to present a 
convincing plan to address the issue. The Commission 
response took the form of a report submitted to 
President Delors by Commissioners Christophersen and 
Frans Andriessen in September 1987. This both 
acknowledged the importance of the subject and 
recommended the establishment of an internal unit 
dedicated to the fight against fraud (3). By October the 
Commission had agreed to take this step, and in July 
of the following year the Coordination of Fraud 
(1) See Chapter 9 ‘The budgetary revolution: from near-bankruptcy 
to stability’.
(2) Resolution pursuant to Article 85 of the financial regulation in-
forming the Commission of the reasons why it cannot at present 
be given a discharge in respect of the implementation of the 
budget for the financial year 1985 (OJ C 125, 11.5.1987, p. 45).
(3) SEC(87) 1310, 11 September 1987, ‘Communication from Mr 
Christophersen and Mr Andriessen in agreement with the Presi-
dent — Report to the Commission on the strengthening of the 
fight against fraud to the detriment of the Community budget’.
Prevention Unit (UCLAF), was established (4). It would 
be directly answerable to the President and would 
operate from within the Secretariat-General.
Over the subsequent decade UCLAF would grow 
substantially, in terms of both its personnel and its 
range of activity. In 1989 it had 10 members of staff; 
a year later this had grown to 30, and by 1993 it had 
over 50. A further 80-90 staff members, primarily 
involved in ‘anti-fraud tasks’, were distributed through 
other parts of the Commission; the largest number, 40, 
in DG VI (Agriculture), reflecting the priority attributed 
to preventing the sizeable common agricultural policy 
budget from being abused (5). Fraud against the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
also assumed a prominent position in the annual 
report on the fight against fraud that the Commission 
undertook to compile from 1989 onwards (6). UCLAF 
built up two sizeable databases called DAF 
(Documentation anti-fraud), on the legal provisions in 
place at Community and national levels, and IRENE 
(Irrégularités, enquêtes et exploitation), which 
catalogued all known cases of irregularities, including 
fraud, and recorded the countermeasures used. And 
the Commission’s own efforts were flanked by a 
systematic attempt to improve coordination with the 
Member States. After all, the largest number of fraud 
cases against the Community budget took place 
during policy implementation, most of which was the 
responsibility of the Member State governments rather 
than the Commission itself. 1993 was a year that 
marked a major milestone in the fight against fraud, 
as on 1 November the Maastricht Treaty entered into 
force, adding a new Article 209a confirming the 
Member States’ obligation to treat the Community’s 
financial interests in the same way as their own in 
combating fraud. In addition, improving the 
Community’s regulations so as to make them less 
(4) SEC(88) 2007, 15 December 1988, ‘Communication from the 
President — Report to the Commission on the action plan of the 
anti-fraud coordination unit’.
(5) COM(94) 94 final, 23 March 1994, ‘Protecting the Commu nity’s 
financial interests — The fight against fraud: 1993 annual 
 report’.
(6) See for example: SEC(90) 156 final, 31 January 1990, ‘The fight 
against fraud — Report on work done and progress achieved 
in 1989’; SEC(91) 456 final/2, 22 March 1991, ‘Report on work 
done and progress achieved in 1990’; SEC(92) 943 final, 26 May 
1992, ‘Report on work done and progress achieved in 1991’; and 
COM(93) 141 final, 20 April 1993, ‘Annual report from the Com-
mission on the fight against fraud — 1992 report and action 
programme for 1993’.
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vulnerable to abuse became a priority (1). In 1995 this 
was taken one step further with the approval of a 
framework regulation on the protection of the 
Community’s financial instruments. This set out a 
uniform set of administrative penalties that could be 
used in all cases of fraud against the Community 
budget and established a broad definition of what 
constituted an irregularity. The Commission was also 
able to persuade the Member States to sign up to a 
convention on the protection of the European 
Communities’ financial interests, designed to make the 
various national laws needed to prosecute those 
accused of fraud more compatible with one 
another (2).
This solid progress could not prevent the rise of public, 
media and European Parliament concern about the 
issue of fraud, however. Of particular importance in 
(1) COM(94) 94 final.
(2) COM(96) 173 final, 8 May 1996, ‘Protecting the Community’s 
financial interests — The fight against fraud: annual report 
1995’.
this regard was the emergence of a series of 
allegations about malpractice within the Commission 
itself. Many of these claims were brought into the 
public domain by a whistle-blower within the European 
Commission, Paul van Buitenen, who in 1998 grew so 
unhappy at what he regarded as the failure of UCLAF 
to crack down upon abuse within its own organisation 
that he went public with his concerns, sending them 
first to the European Parliament and then to the 
press (3). These charges, in combination with the 
refusal of the European Court of Auditors to issue a 
statement of assurance ‘as to the legality and 
regularity of transactions underlying payments for the 
financial year’ — a stance frequently, if inaccurately, 
simplified in the press as a failure to sign off the 
Commission’s overall annual accounts — became 
central to the row that would lead to the collective 
(3) Buitenen, P. (van), Blowing the whistle — One man’s fight 
against fraud in the European Commission, Politico’s, London, 
2000.
Following the accusations that led to the resignation of the Commission, the Unit for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention 
became the European Anti-Fraud Office with an independent investigative mandate.
▶
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it  permitted  — especially towards economic and 
monetary union, but also the extra powers it grant­
ed the Parliament — were flanked by what both the 
Commission and the majority of MEPs regarded as 
ser ious design flaws. The main parliamen tary groups 
thus joined the Commission President in calling 
for the flaws to be redressed by the next round of 
treaty change due in 1996 (1). The new co­decision 
process, furthermore, altered the power dynam­
ics between the Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission, enabling much more direct contact 
between the former two without the Commission 
acting as intermediary. As noted above, the Com­
mission’s fears in this regard were not fully realised, 
but a subtle change in the balance of power had 
nonetheless occurred, making parliamentarians less 
inclined to regard the Commission as their ally in 
all circumstances (2). And MEPs reacted with dis­
may to the popular backlash against the Maastricht 
Treaty that became apparent in the course of 1992, 
with the Danish rejection of the treaty, the French 
‘petit oui’ and difficulties experienced in the United 
Kingdom by John Major’s government in securing 
House of Commons approval. Few blamed Delors 
or the Commission directly. But just as the spirits of 
parliamentarians had earlier been lifted by the ease 
of advance, so their mood darkened as resistance to 
European integration grew. What did not diminish, 
though, was the Parliament’s appetite for greater 
power. Rather the reverse, indeed, as parliamentar­
ians seized on outside criticism of the integration 
process as undemocratic to argue that the only pos­
sible remedy for the EC’s perceived legitimacy defi­
cit was to further increase the prerogatives and re­
sponsibilities of its one directly elected institution. 
The final stages of Delors’s presidency were thus 
played out against a backdrop of a European Parlia­
ment that was anxious and testy about the seeming 
drop in popular support for ‘Europe’, but every bit 
(1) ‘1991­92 session — Report of proceedings from 9 to 13 December 1991’, 
Annex to the Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of the 
European Parliament, No 3­412.
(2) See Chapter 8.2 ‘All change with qualified majority voting: relations with 
the Council’ for details about this change.
resignation of the Santer Commission in 
March 1999.
Part of Santer’s response to the parliamentary and 
media storm set off by the fraud allegations was 
to promise a new and more effective Commission 
structure to fight fraud. The new body was to be 
called the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and 
it was to enjoy a much greater level of 
independence from the Commission than UCLAF 
had done, thereby escaping some of the problems 
of the earlier anti-fraud mechanism. On 
4 December 1998 a draft regulation to this effect 
was submitted by the Commission to the 
Council (1). In the short term, however, this 
innovation did little to subdue the furore either in 
the European Parliament or among the press.
It would therefore take until the start of the new 
century, with a new Commission now in place, for 
the most far-reaching institutional response to the 
crisis of 1998-1999. This took the form of a series 
of reforms, piloted by Neil Kinnock, in the first 
years of the Prodi Commission (2). While they 
undoubtedly standardised Commission 
management practices and clarified lines of 
responsibility, it is widely felt that they also led to 
an increase in bureaucratisation and stifled the 
possibilities of individual initiative (3). The distance 
travelled from the freewheeling practices of the 
early Delors years, however, is indisputable. This 
transformation was not wholly attributable to the 
fight against fraud; there were other reasons 
behind the Commission’s determination to improve 
its internal management. But the anti-fraud 
agenda, and the pressure over this issue exerted 
by the European Parliament, had clearly been a 
major vector for change.
Piers Ludlow
(1) COM(1998) 717 final, 1 December 1998, ‘Proposal for a 
Council regulation (EC, Euratom) establishing a European 
Fraud Investigation Office’.
(2) See interviews with Neil Kinnock, 25 October 2016; and 
Horst Reichenbach, 8 June 2017. See also Chapter 1.3 ‘The 
cabinets’; and Chapter 3 ‘Major changes and colossal chal-
lenges: the directorates-general and staffing in the Com-
mission’.
(3) See interviews with John Frederick Mogg, 17 January 2017; 
and Patricia Bugnot, 15 February 2017.
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as ambitious as before to increase its own powers. It 
would however be his successor, Jacques Santer, who 
would end up being most harmed by this simmering 
parliamentary discontent (1). 
Santer’s first problem with the European Parlia­
ment was the manner in which he obtained his job. 
Many MEPs had hoped that the decision taken at 
Maastricht to make the Commission presidency 
and each European Parliament coterminous (i.e. 
each running for the same 5­year period) would cre­
ate a real link in voters’ minds between their choice 
in the ballot box and the person who emerged as 
Commission President. It was thus particular­
ly galling for the Parliament that the manner in 
which Santer was chosen was not only messy and 
controversial (John Major having vetoed Jean­Luc 
Dehaene, who was the preferred candidate for the 
job), but also a compromise arrived at solely by the 
European Council members. The President of the 
European Parliament, Egon Klepsch, had reminded 
Europe’s leaders as they gathered in Corfu to choose 
the new President that the Parliament would have a 
say in the process, and that any delay in their choice 
could trigger a serious crisis (2). And yet Major’s veto 
meant that the Corfu European Council broke up 
without a choice having been made, Santer’s name 
emerging only from a subsequent emergency Coun­
cil convened in Brussels a month later. Rather than 
the process having become more democratic and 
transparent, the choice of Delors’s successor was 
thus a particularly egregious example of an inter­
governmental compromise. As a result, the mood 
when the Parliament convened in July to vote on the 
new Commission President was angry and frustrat­
ed, and Santer’s nomination was only grudgingly 
(1) Jim Cloos, Santer’s head of cabinet, claims that Pascal Lamy warned him 
as he took up the job that the Parliament would topple the Commission. 
They had tried under Delors but he had been too strong: interview with Jim 
Cloos, 4 July 2016.
(2) ‘Address by the President of the European Parliament, Dr Egon A. Klepsch, 
on the occasion of the meeting of the European Council in Corfu on Friday, 
24 June 1994’: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/Summits/cor3_en.htm 
passed (3). The new Commission President was ap­
proved by 260 votes to 238, with 23 abstentions. It 
was an inauspicious start.
The Parliament’s assertiveness continued when it 
came to the choice of Santer’s colleagues, with MEPs 
going beyond the strict letter of the Maastricht 
Treaty to insist that all would­be members of the 
new Commission undergo individual parliamen­
tary hearings (4). These proved fairly onerous, with 
several nominees publicly criticised either for failing 
to take the hearings themselves sufficiently seriously 
or for lacking the qualities or attitudes that MEPs 
deemed necessary for the jobs that they had been 
(3) A selection of the speeches made can be viewed at https://www.cvce.eu/en/
recherche/unit­content/­/unit/02bb76df­d066­4c08­a58a­d4686a3e68ff/
d604d31a­0355­472a­96ea­6c36b8a17bd9/Resources
(4) On the background to this see interviews with Klaus Hänsch, 30 June 2016; 
and Michel Vanden Abeele, 18 June 2017.
European Parliament poster on the occasion of the fourth 
European elections in 1994.
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allocated. The Irish Commissioner, Pádraig Flynn, 
for instance, was subject to sharp criticism over sex­
ist comments he was reported to have made in the 
course of the Irish presidential election campaign 
won by Mary Robinson. Such views, it was suggest­
ed, disqualified Flynn from that part of his social 
affairs portfolio which dealt with equal opportun­
ities  (1). In the event, however, Santer was able to 
counter­attack well, first by presenting an ambitious 
and activist programme for his 5­year term, then by 
promising to treat MEPs as equals, and finally by 
taking personal responsibility for overseeing pol­
icy on equal opportunity, development issues and 
human rights  (2). This helped secure much more 
clear­cut parliamentary approval than many had 
expected: the new Commission team received the 
backing of 416 MEPs, with only 103 against and 59 
abstentions. The incoming President’s pledge to im­
prove the Commission’s financial management and 
to crack down on fraud would come back to haunt 
him, however. On management, the new President 
promised MEPs:
‘Let us be frank: this is an area in which I 
believe the Commission must make a 
special effort. Certainly, 80 % of Community 
expenditure is implemented by the 
governments of the Member States. But this 
does not relieve us from meeting our 
responsibilities in respect of the budget. The 
European Parliament, as well as the Court 
of Auditors, is constantly reminding the 
Commission of this fact. My colleagues and 
I are determined to improve the 
Commission’s budgetary and administrative 
culture. And I wish to stress here the 
importance of our constructive relations 
with the Court of Auditors and this House. 
When the criticism is justified, we shall take 
corrective action’ (3).
(1) Financial Times, 12 January 1995.
(2) For Santer’s programme speech, see ‘1994­95 session — Report of proceed­
ings from 16 to 20 January 1995’, Annex to the Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Communities: Debates of the European Parliament, No 4­456; for his 
subsequent pledges, see Financial Times, 19 January 1995.
(3) ‘1994­95 session  — Report of proceedings from 16 to 20  January 1995’, 
p. 18.
Despite the unexpectedly strong parliamentary vote 
in favour of the members of his Commission,  Santer 
still faced problems at parliamentary level. One in­
dication of this would arrive with the renegotiation 
of the code of conduct that the Delors Commission 
had given the Parliament in 1990. This, all sides 
acknowledged, would now need to be adjusted to 
take account of the treaty changes brought about by 
Maastricht. But the suggested amendments put for­
ward by the Parliament in December 1994 went far 
beyond a simple update. Instead, all of those who ex­
amined the proposed new text at Commission level 
concurred that the Parliament’s draft amounted to 
an entirely new set of proposals that both substan­
tially increased the Parliament’s  powers and rights 
and threatened those of the Commission. As one 
of the Commission’s legal analyses put it: ‘Whilst 
many of the demands taken individually seem rather 
anodyne, others would be a serious limitation of the 
independent role of the Commission. More serious­
ly, taken collectively they would significantly affect 
the institutional balance and reduce the independ­
ent role of the Commission in the interinstitution­
al process to that of a go­between between Coun­
cil and Parliament. These proposals would make 
all negotiations in the Council very difficult’  (4). 
Santer had, however, committed his institution to 
a new deal when making his invest iture speech to 
the Parliament. The Commission was thus faced 
with an uphill battle to turn a totally unacceptable 
text into one they could live with. Quite how dif­
ficult this was can be seen from the Commission’s 
internal discussion of the negotiations in February, 
when Commissioner after Commissioner lined up 
to criticise the text as it stood  (5). But in the end 
Marcelino Oreja, the Commissioner for Relations 
with the European Parliament, was able to extract a 
reworded agreement from his European Parliament 
counterparts that was deemed  acceptable, and a new 
(4) HAEU, DORIE 746, ‘Note from Ms O’Dwyer to Mr Eeckhout on the 
code of conduct’, Brussels, 16 January 1995.
(5) HAEC, PV(95), Minutes No  1236, second part, meeting of 22  February 
1995.
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text was agreed upon in March (1). The lengthy tus­
sle only confirmed, however, that the Strasbourg–
Brussels relationship would not be easy, and that 
the Parliament’s quest for additional authority was 
unlikely to be tempered by any sense that it and 
the Commission had a fundamental alliance of 
 interest (2).
Confirmation of this unwelcome reality would 
be provided by the next serious clash between the 
Parliament and the Commission, namely that over 
 bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). The 
 basic details of this affair are discussed elsewhere in 
this volume  (3), but what mattered in the context 
of relations between the Parliament and the Com­
mission is that the former was fully prepared to 
condemn the Commission’s actions and inactions 
over the affair in the most outspoken of terms. The 
final report, written by Manuel Medina Ortega and 
snappily entitled ‘Report on alleged contraventions 
and maladministration in the implementation of 
Community law in relation to BSE, without preju­
dice to the jurisdiction of the Community and na­
tional courts’, did not mince its words (4):
‘1. The work of the Committee of Inquiry has 
revealed that the Commission is guilty of serious 
errors and omissions. To all appearances, the Com­
missioners, particularly Mr MacSharry and Mr 
Steichen in the period 1990­1994  … bear a clear 
political responsibility. The current Commissioner, 
Mr Fischler, must also take responsibility for blatant 
instances of negligence, above all the Commission 
(1) For the Commission’s congratulations to Oreja for securing a new deal 
see HAEC, PV(95), Minutes No  1239, meeting of 14  March 1995; for 
the  intermediate steps en route to this deal see HAEU, DORIE 746, 
SP(95)  729/2, ‘Relations with the European Parliament  — Note for 
 information from Mr Oreja concerning his meeting with the Conference 
of Presidents of the European Parliament’.
(2) Hänsch acknowledges having been one of those MEPs who increasingly 
rejected the notion that the Parliament and the Commission were natural 
allies: interview with Klaus Hänsch, 30 June 2016.
(3) See Chapter 14.1 ‘The common agricultural policy’.
(4) European Parliament, A4­0020/97, ‘Report on alleged contraventions or 
maladministration in the implementation of Community law in  relation 
to BSE, without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Community and 
 national courts’, 7 February 1997: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/confe­
rences/19981130/bse/a4002097_en.htm#AI 
decision … lifting the export ban on gelatin, tallow 
and semen and the misleading of the Committee of 
Inquiry on the issue of the legal basis for a ban on 
exports of meat­and­bone meal …
2. Parliament cannot clear the Commission as 
an institution from responsibility for the errors 
committed by Commissioners no longer in office. 
Accordingly, the current Commission must be 
called on to assume its political responsibilities and 
take, within a suitable period, the requisite structur­
al, political and staff­related decisions and measures 
arising out of the instances of negligence and errors 
noted by the committee.
3. The appropriate sanctions available to Parlia­
ment under the Treaty with a view to calling the 
Commission politically to account are a motion 
of no confidence, pursuant to Article  144 of the 
 Treaty, or the initiation of proceedings for failure to 
act/a breach of the Treaty, pursuant to Article 175.
4. The Committee considers that measures must 
be taken in response to the BSE crisis and the ser­
ious failings on the part of the Commission and the 
United Kingdom, in such a way as to bring about 
tangible changes for the future. Measures which 
may bring about or lead to a change in approach of 
this kind are set out in section II. The Commission 
should assume its political responsibility and take 
an active part in the implementation of these meas­
ures within the next few months.
5. Finally, the Committee of Inquiry calls upon 
Parliament to be meticulous in exercising its  power 
of scrutiny vis­à­vis the Commission and to pay 
particular attention to the way in which the Com­
mission henceforth handles the BSE crisis and acts 
upon the recommendations in this report.’
A vote of censure on the Commission’s handling of 
the affair was duly taken in February 1997 but was 
comprehensively defeated, by 326 votes to 118 (with 
15 abstentions). But a further warning shot about 
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the Parliament’s impatience with Commission mis­
management and negligence had been fired. 
It is against this backdrop of stormy Strasbourg–
Brussels relations that the crisis that would ultim­
ately provoke the resignation of the Santer Com­
mission needs to be understood (1). The trigger for 
the trial of strength between the Parliament and the 
Commission was the coincidence of a critical Court 
(1) Liikanen is particularly insistent that the Parliament’s behaviour needs to 
be seen as that of ‘a young institution’ with few of the restraints imposed 
by national political cultures: interview with Erkki Liikanen, 20 October 
2017.
of Auditors report into the 1996 budget, issued in 
late 1998, and a mounting series of allegations sur­
rounding fraud within the European Commission. 
Particularly damaging among the latter were the 
claims of the Commission whistle­blower Paul van 
Buitenen, since they combined accusations levelled 
against very senior members of the Commission, es­
pecially Édith Cresson, and the suggestion that the 
Commission as an institution had been slow and 
unwilling to act against those of its own accused of 
impropriety (2).
(2) Buitenen, P. (van), Blowing the whistle — One man’s fight against fraud in the 
European Commission, Politico’s, London, 2000.
‘The error lies there!’ 
In 1999, accused of mismanagement, the European Commission underwent a serious crisis.
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The heady mixture of suggested financial mis­
management, loose internal discipline and alleged 
wrongdoing by senior figures proved to be  exactly 
what the Parliament had been waiting for in terms 
of proving its strength against the Commission, and 
represented irresistible fare for the media too  (1). 
The outcome was a parliamentary and press storm 
that the Santer Commission struggled to con­
trol  (2). In December 1998 the President tried to 
impress the Parliament with his seriousness on the 
issue by promising to create a new anti­fraud body, 
the Euro pean Anti­Fraud Office, designed to be 
more independent and hence more effective. But 
it was too little too late to appease Strasbourg. On 
17  December, after several days of stormy debate 
during which Santer had threatened to resign, the 
(1) For a discussion of the interaction between the press and the Parliament 
over this issue see interview with Patricia Bugnot, 15 February 2017.
(2) Both Bugnot and Kinnock, in rather different ways, stress that Santer was 
always struggling to react to the crisis, rather than being able to impose his 
reading of it or his solution: see interviews with Patricia Bugnot, 15 Febru­
ary 2017; and Neil Kinnock, 25 October 2016.
Parliament refused to discharge the Community’s 
budget and tabled a motion of censure against the 
Commission. This was narrowly defeated in early 
January, but the Parliament then decided to set up 
an independent committee of inquiry to investigate 
the various allegations. It would be in light of the 
conclusions of the latter in March 1999 that  Santer 
and his colleagues would submit their collect ive 
resignation.
Their key failing, the report made clear, was that 
of refusing to take responsibility for malpractice. 
The vast majority of the allegations that had been 
swirling around about the Commissioners’ own 
abuse of the system were dismissed as unfounded. 
Instead, the misconduct that was found tended to 
be concentrated at a rather lower level of the hier­
archy, often involving the use of external agents. But 
what made it impossible for the Santer Commission 
to ride out the storm was the general criticism of 
lax management within the Commission, and the 
The Committee of Independent Experts (‘Committee of Wise Men’) submitted its report on who was responsible for mismanagement 
by the Commission in March 1999. 
From left to right: José María Gil-Robles, President of the European Parliament; Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission; 
and André Middelhoek, member of the Committee of Independent Experts.
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more particular complaint that no one in the system 
had appeared to feel a personal sense of responsibil­
ity for mismanagement (1). The single most damn­
ing phrase, added it is claimed in the last hours of 
the ‘wise men’s’ deliberations, was: ‘It is becoming 
difficult to find anyone [in the Commission] who 
has even the slightest sense of responsibility’ (2). It 
was not fraud itself, in other words, that lay at the 
heart of the affair, but rather a hands­off manage­
ment culture in which, even when irregularities 
were dis covered, sanctions against those responsible 
were slow and half­hearted, and where the problem 
of abuse was regarded as being much less import­
ant than the fulfilment of the Commission’s  wider 
objectives. This helps explain why Neil Kinnock 
would be asked to embark on an important set of 
reforms of how the Commission functioned in the 
first years of the 21st century (3). 
What is important to stress, however, is that the 
 crisis that would ultimately force Santer to resign 
did not emerge suddenly and unexpectedly. In­
stead it constituted the culmination of an increas­
ingly confrontational and ill­tempered relation­
ship between the European Parliament and the 
Commission. Indeed the earlier passages of arms 
between the Parliament and the Commission, de­
tailed above, influenced both the way in which the 
Commission viewed the row and the refusal of the 
Parliament to back down on this occasion. Further­
more, the under lying themes of the 1998­1999 row 
reson ated strongly among MEPs who had witnessed 
the earlier BSE  argument. Once again, it appeared, 
the Commission had both failed in its duty ade­
quately to supervise the behaviour of some of its 
staff and had then compounded its initial errors 
by being  obstructive and uncooperative with the 
(1) The full text of the report is available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
experts/report1_en.htm
(2) Priestley, J., Six battles that shaped Europe’s Parliament, John Harper 
 Publishing, London, 2008, p. 194.
(3) For more details see Chapter 1.3 ‘The cabinets’; and Chapter 3 ‘Major 
changes and colossal challenges: the directorates­general and staffing in the 
Commission’.
 Parliament’s attempts to establish what had gone 
wrong. A second acquittal became much less likely 
as a result.
Viewed even more broadly, it is also important to 
emphasise how much the roots of the fall of the 
Santer Commission lay in the much longer­term 
push by the European Parliament to increase its 
own power and authority. For much of the period 
since 1958 the European Commission had support­
ed this aim, sharing Strasbourg’s belief that it was 
only through such a development that the European 
system as a whole could gain democratic legitimacy. 
But throughout much of the 1990s it proved hard 
to back this crusade without endangering the Com­
mission’s own power and authority. A much more 
adversarial dynamic had thus built up in Parlia­
ment–Commission relations, with MEPs ever more 
inclined to regard themselves as the protectors of the 
European public against alleged negligence or mis­
use of authority by the European Commission (4). It 
was not without irony, however, that the main vic­
tim of this growing interinstitutional antagonism 
was not the Delors Commission, under which many 
of the core management problems had developed — 
largely it must be said because the Commission was 
being asked to do too much (5) — and that genuine­
ly did exhibit some attitudes that could be regarded 
as power hungry, but instead the much less forceful 
Santer Commission that followed. Santer thus was 
as much a victim of a pattern of interinstitutional 
relations traceable back to the Delors period as he 
was of any failings that he and his own Commission 
exhibited (6).
Piers Ludlow
(4) Interview with Klaus Hänsch, 30 June 2016.
(5) As much of this volume illustrates, the Delors years were a time during 
which the range of Commission activities expanded enormously. Manage­
ment structures and techniques did not always keep pace with this relentless 
change.
(6) According to Cloos, Santer ruled out defending himself by pointing out 
that many of the failings that he was being accused of dated back to his 
 predecessor: interview with Jim Cloos, 4 July 2016.
